Date:         Fri, 4 Jul 2003 06:49:10 -0400
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Subject:      IWPR's Tribunal Update No. 318
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Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2003 10:49:57 +0100
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WELCOME TO IWPR'S TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 318, July 03, 2003

MILOSEVIC'S POLICE AND THE MASSACRES - New revelations about the
Serbian police involved in the Srebrenica operation.  By Emir Suljagic
in The Hague

BOSNIAN SERBS HAD "MUP LINK" - Mystery witness gives first-hand account of
Milosevic's police at work in Bosnia.  By Emir Suljagic and Stacy Sullivan
in The Hague

SREBRENICA RESURFACES IN HOLLAND - New evidence on the Srebrenica massacre
fans debate over actions of Dutch peacekeepers'.  By Karen Meirik in The
Hague

CONTROVERSY OVER DOCUMENT LEAK RESURFACES - Evidence cited in Milosevic
trial raises issues about who leaked Croatian president Mesic's secret
testimony.  By Emir Suljagic in The Hague

BELGRADE REJECTS US EXEMPTION DEAL - Serbia-Montenegro says no to US
request for non-extradition arrangement.  By Milanka Saponja-Hadzic
in Belgrade

INTERVIEW: HAGUE TRIBUNAL PRESIDENT THEODOR MERON - Tribunal is well on
course to completing its mandate, but fugitive suspects must be brought
to justice before 2008.  By Stacy Sullivan in The Hague

BRIEFLY NOTED - Compiled by Emir Suljagic and Stacy Sullivan in The Hague

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MILOSEVIC'S POLICE AND THE MASSACRES

New revelations about the Serbian police involved in the Srebrenica
operation.

By Emir Suljagic in The Hague

Bosnian Serb police documents obtained by IWPR in The Hague provide new
details of how Slobodan Milosevic's police participated in the massacre
in the United Nations "Safe Area" of Srebrenica in July 1995.

Belgrade's hand in the slaughter was first exposed two weeks ago when
IWPR obtained from the tribunal a copy of an order from Bosnian Serb
interior minister Tomislav Kovac ordering police units that included
members of Serbia's interior ministry, MUP, to be relocated from
Sarajevo to Srebrenica on July 10, 1995.

That order, the first piece of evidence linking Milosevic - as supreme
commander of Serbia's MUP - to the worst atrocity of the Bosnian war,
dealt a serious blow to the central tenet of the former Serb president's -
that neither he nor the forces under his command were involved with
atrocities committed in Bosnia.

IWPR's documents are daily combat reports written by Colonel Ljubomir
Borovcanin, the Bosnian Serb police commander in the Srebrenica operation.
They give more details on the Serbian MUP units which were involved, and
paint a picture of consistent Serbian police involvement throughout the
Bosnian war.

Borovcanin has been indicted by The Hague for the role he and his police
force are said to have played in the killing of more than 7,000 men and
boys from Srebrenica.

Although they are far from conclusive - many more documents will have
to be uncovered and many more witnesses questioned before a picture
of Belgrade's role in the massacres is fully understood - they go
even further in undermining Milosevic's claims to the contrary.

Borovcanin's reports show that at least three substantial units of
Serbian police fought under his command around Sarajevo before he
was redeployed to Srebrenica. At the time, he was deputy commander of
Bosnian Serb's Special Police Brigade.

He and his troops were fighting to maintain control of Trnovo, a key town
just outside the Bosnian capital for most of June and into early July. As
well as his Bosnian Serb policemen, he talks about three Serbian MUP units
titled "Kajman", "Plavi" and "Skorpija". It is unclear what strength these
were - but they were at least company size, since they were big enough to
be divided into platoons

In a report to the Bosnian Serb interior ministry dated June 30, 1995,
Borovcanin wrote that troops under his command including the Kajman unit
attacked Bosnian army positions on the road between Sarajevo and Trnovo.
In his report, he complained that poor intelligence had hampered the
operation and that two of his men had been wounded as a result.

The following day, on July 1, 1995, he filed another report saying that
he had renewed his attacks and that this time two platoons from each of
the three Serbian MUP units under his command were taking part.  This
time, he said, the operation was more successful and his troops had
overrun Bosnian army positions and captured some weapons and a cache
of "high-quality" documents.

Nine days later, Borovcanin received his order from the Bosnian Serb
interior minister to form a special police force and move it up to
Srebrenica. The order did not say how many men from Serbian MUP were
involved, but indicated they formed part of one company-strength unit.
Until now it was unclear what formations they belonged to, but IWPR's
documents suggest that they were drawn from two of the units at Trnovo -
Kajman and Plavi.

This deduction is based on a report filed on July 24, 1995 by police
commander Savo Cvijetinovic, who took over the Trnovo operation after
Borovcanin left.  His report on troop rotation shows that only one
Serbian MUP unit, Skorpija, remained under his command.

Other documents in the dossier show that Serbian police participation in
operations across Bosnia was not incidental but routine, and that they
and the Bosnian Serb police cooperated closely and relayed orders to
one another.

Among the most damning documents is an April 13, 1994 telex signed by the
Bosnian Serb border police chief at Bijeljina, Predrag Jesuric, relaying
a request from the Serbian police that the Bosnian Serb defence ministry
give them 24 hours notice before bringing in arms, ammunition, explosives
and other military items from Serbia.

Another is a August 26, 1995 letter from the Bosnian Serb police in
Bijeljina to the Serbian and Montenegrin MUP asking for the return of
several trucks and buses that had been stolen in Srebrenica and were
believed to be registered in Serbia with false documents.

Emir Suljagic is an IWPR reporter in The Hague.


BOSNIAN SERBS HAD "MUP LINK"

Mystery witness gives first-hand account of Milosevic's police at work
in Bosnia.

By Emir Suljagic and Stacy Sullivan in The Hague

The public wasn't told much about the witness whom the prosecution called
to testify against former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic - his voice
was distorted, he was referred to as B-1244, he came from Bosnian "region
number three", and he allegedly had extensive contacts with officials
referred to as "numbers 1 to 24".

His testimony was also confusing and difficult to follow - like a bad
spy novel - but in the end it did provide a clear picture of how both
police and military from Serbia aided the Bosnian Serbs in their war.

Essentially, B-1244 said, it went like this - the Bosnian Serbs and
opposition parties from Serbia provided the men, the Serbian Interior
Ministry, MUP, trained them and the Yugoslav army provided the weapons.

His description has added more weight to the prosecution's effort to
show that the armed forces of Serbia and the Bosnian Serb Republic were
not separate entities, as Milosevic alleges, but actually one force
that ultimately answered to Belgrade.

From what could be deduced in court, B-1244 was a Bosnian Serb official of
some rank from a northern Bosnian town not far from the Croatian border.

In late February 1992, before the war in Bosnia began, the witness went
to Belgrade on a social call, and somehow ended up meeting officials
from the Serbian and Yugoslav secret services. He later found out that
they were involved in training and arming Serbs from his home town.

On the way back home, he was accompanied by official "Number 13",
who informed him that 20 young men from their town would be sent to
a training camp in Ilok, a town in eastern Slavonija, Croatia, which
Serb forces had recently captured.

A month later, B-1244 went to Belgrade again. This time, "Number 13"
asked him to go up to Ilok to visit the men being trained there. He was
instructed to go to Serbian police headquarters in Belgrade and get in
touch with Milan Prodanic, a secret service officer who was involved
in the recruitment and training process.

B-1244 did as he was told and met Prodanic at the police headquarters
reception desk.  He asked how he could get to the camp, and Prodanic
told him to follow a police vehicle which was going there.

As it turned out, the man in the car which witness B-1244 was asked
to follow was Franko Simatovic, the head of the intelligence branch
of Milosevic's secret service and commander of the feared "Red Beret"
special forces.  Simatovic was visiting the training camp that day to
check on how Serb volunteers from Bosnia were being trained.

"He was wearing civilian clothes, but the men with him had camouflage
uniforms, with red berets stuck in their shoulder straps," B-1244 said.

B-1244 followed the other car to the Ilok camp. When they reached the
entrance, their cars were halted, and Simatovic got out and spoke to
the guards.  He ordered them to find an escort for B-1244 and take him
to where the 20 men from his home town were training.

"I stayed there for an hour or so," B-1244 said.

On April 11, 1992, the trainees returned from Ilok to B-1244's town,
accompanied by another 30 men from Serbia. They were transported there
in Yugoslav army helicopters, the witness said.  All 50 set up camp
in a village outside the town, and were incorporated into an existing
Yugoslav army brigade based locally.  The local Serb authorities
provided them with food and lodging.

According to B-1244, these volunteers, some of whom had fought in
eastern Slavonija, were not taking part purely for patriotic reasons,
but also because they were rewarded with the fruits of war. For example,
the men were given Mercedes and Volkswagens that had belonged to Muslims
and Croats in the town.

"They were given war booty.  The local crisis staff [wartime
administration] knew about it, and actually approved giving vehicles
to them," B-1244 said.

He said that groups of men who had recently been trained - together with
police from Serbia - then took over the town and detained the non-Serbs
who lived there. Muslims and Croats, he said, were held at the police
station and in the gymnasiums of local primary and secondary schools.
Some of them were members of armed Muslim and Croat groups, but others
were just civilians.

"Some of the people being held there were mistreated - they were beaten
up, sexually abused, and some of them were even killed.  And the local
authorities were informed about what was happening," the witness said.

In late April or early May, B-1244 said he went to Belgrade with the
Yugoslav army unit commander, named only as "Number 16", to tell Simatovic
what was happening in the town's detention centres. Simatovic asked
"Number 16" to write a report about it, but the man had literacy problems.

"He said he couldn't write a report because he wasn't very good at
writing," B-1244 recalled. "I don't know if he ever wrote the report,
but I don't think he did."

At some point that spring, the witness says, a young Serb who was
reportedly part of a Yugoslav army unit, got drunk and opened fire
on Muslim and Croat detainees with a rifle, killing 20 of them.

B-1244 later went as part of a delegation to Belgrade to discuss
their concerns about commander "Number 16" with Simatovic.

"What fool appointed him commander of the unit?" Simatovic reportedly
asked.

B-1244 and his associates said they did not have the authority to replace
"Number 16" and asked Simatovic to intervene on their behalf by calling
General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the newly-formed Bosnian Serb Army.

Mladic ordered the group to go back home - but the commander in question
was eventually removed from office and imprisoned.

"Number 16" was not happy about being in jail, and asked B-1244 to go back
to Belgrade to seek his release. B-1244 agreed to do so, but was unable
to track Simatovic down. By chance, he came across Jovica Stanisic, the
overall head of Milosevic's police force. Stanisic made a phone call and
"Number 16" was released.

B-1244's story of his interaction with Simatovic and Stanisic - both of
whom answered to Milosevic - appears to show a clear connection between
Serbia's MUP and the Bosnian Serb forces.

During cross-examination, Milosevic was able to punch some holes in the
witness's evidence.

For example, he asked B-1244 whether the men from Serbia who came to fight
in his town were part of Serbian MUP, or whether they were volunteers from
the Serbian Radical Party. B-1244 appeared to change tack and answered
that they were in fact from the radical party.

When Milosevic suggested that this meant that the men were acting on their
own initiative rather than as part of a formal effort organised by MUP,
the witness answered, "That's right."

Milosevic then pointed out that Simatovic had traveled to the training
camp in Ilok in civilian clothes and asked whether it was not possible
he had gone there as a private citizen, not in his official role. B-1244
again conceded that this was a possibility.

However, when the prosecution was given an opportunity to ask a few more
questions after the cross-examination was over, there seemed little room
for doubt that Milosevic's police were involved in what happened in this
part of Bosnia in an official capacity.

When asked whether Simatovic's men played a role in the takeover of the
town, B-1244 replied, "Yes, they played a very significant role."

Finally, the witness was asked whether the training camp at Ilok was
run by "patriotic volunteers".

"Well, they told us it was a MUP camp," he said.

Emir Suljagic is an IWPR reporter in The Hague. Stacy Sullivan is
IWPR project manager in The Hague.


SREBRENICA RESURFACES IN HOLLAND

New evidence on the Srebrenica massacre fans debate over actions of
Dutch peacekeepers.

By Karen Meirik in The Hague

A document published by IWPR proving Serbian involvement in the
Bosnian Serb operation to overrun Srebrenica has revived debate about
the Netherlands' role during the massacre.

The Dutch parliament was just concluding the final debate on the matter
when IWPR released the July 10, 1995 order from the Bosnian Serb interior
minister directing a police commander to move troops, including members of
Serbia's police, to the Srebrenica area. The commander, Colonel Ljubomir
Borovcanin, was subsequently indicted by the Hague war crimes tribunal
for his alleged role in the massacre.  More than 7,000 men and boys
from Srebrenica were killed in July 1995 while under the protection of
Dutch peacekeepers.

The document links former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to the
atrocity since he was the supreme commander of Serbia's police force.
He has denied any part in actions carried out by the Bosnian Serbs.

For the Dutch it raises questions about their own troops' actions.
"If the Muslim offensive on July 10 was important enough to make the
[Bosnian] Serb troops ask for reinforcements, then why didn't Dutchbat
[the peacekeeping battalion from the Netherlands] draw the same
conclusion?" asks Marijke Vos, a Green party member of the Dutch
parliament who has a long commitment to the issue.

She says that she is determined to ask further questions in parliament
about why the Dutch troops charged with protecting Srebrenica did not
respond to rapidly-changing events with the same speed that attacking
Serb forces did.

Vos's questions are unlikely to be enthusiastically received. The day
before IWPR published the document, the Dutch parliament wrapped up an
investigation into Srebrenica by concluding that while the Netherlands
had a moral responsibility towards the victims, its troops were not
guilty of the fall of the enclave or the horrific events that followed.

Defence minister Henk Kamp went so far as to demand full rehabilitation
of the Dutch peacekeeping battalion.

Serious objections to the minister's suggestion were immediately
expressed by the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), an association of
churches that has been active in the Srebrenica debate.

An IKV spokesman told IWPR that the newly published document confirmed
its earlier opinion that the peacekeepers did not react appropriately
to Bosnian Muslims' attempts to defend themselves. Dion van den Berg,
IKV's Srebrenica expert, said the Dutch soldiers had made an agreement
with the Bosnian Muslims to work together to defend Srebrenica. "Why
didn't the parliamentary inquiry give more attention to this?"

Social Democrat Bert Bakker, who headed the parliamentary committee
on Srebrenica, disagrees. He said that there was no formal agreement
between the Dutch and the Muslims to defend the enclave, but rather an
"unofficial understanding" that observation posts would be handed over
to Muslim fighters should Dutch soldiers have to retreat.

"I think the Bosnian Serbs took the counteroffensive of July 10 very
seriously," he said. "They knew American weapons had been flown in.
They must have concluded the Bosnian army was not as weak as they
thought before."

Bakker said that although the new document did raise questions about the
Dutch involvement, it would not make sense to keep re-opening the debate
and it would be better to have a broader international inquiry once the
Milosevic trial is over.

Nor does the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, NIOD, which
issued 7,000-page report on Srebrenica last year that resulted in the
Dutch cabinet standing down, see a need to re-examine the peacekeepers'
actions.

"Dutchbat was not really aware of a Muslim counter-attack - it was not
an offensive, mind you. The terrain was much too rugged," Dick Schoonoord,
a military historian and former Dutch Royal Marine officer who worked on
the report, told IWPR.

The NIOD report found no evidence that Belgrade was involved in the
massacre, and Schoonoord said the document uncovered by IWPR did not
change that conclusion.

"How can we be sure these Serbs weren't actually volunteers from Serbia
and were therefore outside the Yugoslav chain of command?" said
Schoonoord. "And as for Serbian regulars - what  was the exact
command-and-control relationship in this case between the Republika
Srpska Ministry of the Interior, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior
and Milosevic, even if overall responsibility rested with the latter?"

Renowned Milosevic biographer Adam LeBor also said that he still
does not believe that Milosevic ordered the massacre, "Deployment
and use of Serbian interior ministry police in military situations in
Bosnia and Srebrenica, even with Belgrade's or Milosevic's knowledge,
does not imply or mean that they were ordered by Belgrade or Milosevic
to massacre thousands of prisoners of war."

He added that doing so would not have fitted with Milosevic's political
objectives at that time, "He was losing diplomatically, and was ready to
end the Bosnian war, as is clear from his behaviour at Dayton later that
year. Why would he want a ghastly event like Srebrenica to take place?
It would not benefit his political and diplomatic strategy."

One thing is clear. The document seems to have raised more questions
about the role Belgrade played at Srebrenica than it answers. Some will
no doubt be answered as more evidence surfaces in the Milosevic trial.

"The discovery of this document as well as some of the recent testimonies
in the Milosevic trial emphasize the importance for Belgrade as well as
Sarajevo to open their archives," said Bakker.

Karen Meirik is a freelance journalist in the Netherlands.


CONTROVERSY OVER DOCUMENT LEAK RESURFACES

Evidence cited in Milosevic trial raises issues about who leaked
Croatian president Mesic's secret testimony.

By Emir Suljagic in The Hague

Allegations that the lawyer who defended Bosnian Croat general Tihomir
Blaskic before The Hague tribunal may have leaked confidential evidence
resurfaced at another hearing this week.

Documents which Hague prosecutors handed to former Serbian president
Slobodan Milosevic as evidence suggest that prominent Zagreb lawyer
Ante Nobilo passed the Croatian leadership a secret statement that
Stjepan Mesic - now president, but opposition leader at the time - gave
during Blaskic's 1997 hearing.

Nobilo still represents Blaskic, who is appealing after being convicted on
19 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. He has consistently
denied involvement in leaking the statement - in which Mesic accused the
then Croatian leadership of complicity in atrocities in neighbouring
Bosnia - since excerpts from it appeared in a newspaper back in November
and December 2000.

The new documents consist of transcripts, including one which appears
to be of a May 1997 meeting between the late Croatian president Franjo
Tudjman, his chief of staff Goran Radin, defence minister Gojko Susak,
National Security Advisor Markica Rebic, and two newspaper editors.
This contains what purports to be a discussion on whether to publish
Mesic's testimony, as a way of portraying the increasingly popular
opposition politician as a traitor.

"I spoke to lawyer Nobilo. He does not oppose it - in fact, he said
it would be good to publish it -  but we can't say that he gave us
the statement because he has to be discreet," one of the participants
is reported as saying.

Tudjman, who habitually recorded all his meetings for posterity, told
the newspaper editors, "Mr. Mesic has gone and testified that I should
be summoned to the Hague tribunal. We want you to publish the document,
but we also want to talk about it with you."

In a telephone interview, Nobilo told IWPR that these transcripts were
inaccurate.

"Those allegations were raised long ago. There is no truth in it,"
he said.

Under the rules of the tribunal, Mesic's statement was supposed to
remain anonymous, with only the prosecution and defence knowing that he
had testified. Whoever did release it was acting in contempt of court.

Tribunal spokesman James Landale said that such breaches were treated
as a matter of great concern, "The tribunal takes any allegation of
this sort very seriously, and with all allegations of this nature
we have legal proceedings."

Although the transcripts - if true - confirm that the Croatian leadership
got hold of Mesic's testimony, Tudjman's proposal to publish it in the
press was not acted on at the time.  Excerpts appeared much later - in
November 2000 - in Slobodan Dalmacija, a Croatian newspaper with strong
ties to Tudjman's right-wing Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ.  This was
widely perceived as a smear attempt against Mesic, who had just become
president.

The Mesic statement was relevant in the Blaskic trial because the latter
was in command of Bosnian Croat forces in central Bosnia. Many of the
charges against him related to the 1993 massacre of Muslim civilians in
the village of Ahmici. Tudjman always maintained that Zagreb had nothing
to do with the actions of Bosnian Croat military forces. In 2000, at the
end of a two-year trial, Blaskic was sentenced to 45 years jail.

Emir Suljagic is an IWPR reporter in The Hague.


BELGRADE REJECTS US EXEMPTION DEAL

Serbia-Montenegro says no to US request for non-extradition arrangement.

By Milanka Saponja-Hadzic in Belgrade

Just days after Washington certified Serbian and Montenegro for a new
round of aid money, government officials in Belgrade said that they will
not agree to exempt Americans from prosecution before the International
Criminal Court, ICC.

The announcement came as a surprise because only a few days ago, the
United States ambassador to Serbia and Montenegro, William Montgomery,
cautioned that if Belgrade did not sign a bilateral agreement granting the
exemption, Washington would withhold the military aid it was planning to
provide.

Interviewed by IWPR just before the July 1 deadline set by the US,
Serbian prime minister Zoran Zivkovic said his country would not sign,
and appeared to brush off Montgomery's threat. He said he hoped the US
would understand that signing the bilateral agreement could destabilise
the country and trigger a political crisis.

Several political analysts suggested that Belgrade felt free to reject the
deal because Washington may have quietly signalled that it would not cut
off military aid, as it has threatened to do to any country that refused
to sign the agreement. They argued that Serbia and Montenegro had gained
favour with the US for doing so much to cooperate with the Hague tribunal.

However, on July 1, the United States confirmed that Serbia and Montenegro
would in fact be among the nearly 50 countries that could lose military
aid.

The bilateral agreements are part of the American Service Members
Protection Act of 2002, which demands that all countries who are party
to the ICC agreement except for NATO's 19 members and nine other non-NATO
allies agree not to extradite Americans to the court. If they do not sign
up to this, they will be banned from receiving any US military aid. The
deadline for signing the agreements was July 1.

Many of the successor states to Yugoslavia have said they find it
hypocritical of the United States to demand that they hand over their
citizens accused of war crimes to the Hague tribunal while at the same
time agreeing never to extradite Americans. But perhaps more importantly,
they have been reluctant to sign the agreements with Washington because
they fear it might jeopardise their chances of accession to the European
Union, which has been highly critical of the United States' actions.

Some 40 countries have signed bilateral agreements including Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Macedonia.  However, aside from Serbia
and Montenegro, both Croatia and Slovenia have declined to sign. And while
Bosnia did sign an agreement, it said it might withdraw its signature if
the EU demanded it as a precursor for membership.

International law experts in Serbia say it is hard to reconcile the
American demand with the principles of universal human rights.

"How could Serbia - which still has difficulties getting its citizens
to support cooperation with the Hague tribunal - easily agree to exempt
other war crimes suspects from prosecution and international justice?"
asked Mirko Tepavac, a member of the International Relations Forum.

Milanka Saponja-Hadzic is an IWPR contributor in Belgrade.


INTERVIEW: HAGUE TRIBUNAL PRESIDENT THEODOR MERON

Tribunal is well on course to completing its mandate, but fugitive
suspects must be brought to justice before 2008.

By Stacy Sullivan in The Hague

In March this year, Theodor Meron, a Polish-born American who is a law
professor at New York University, was elected president of International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, in The Hague.

Unlike his predecessors, who had to fight to ensure the court's survival,
Meron has inherited an established tribunal with 40 accused in the dock.
But he also inherited a deadline by which to try them all.

In an interview with IWPR, the new president - a Holocaust survivor who
holds degrees from the University of Jerusalem and Harvard Law School and
has written a book analysing the role of international law in
Shakespeare's Henry V - discussed the proposed 2008 closing date set by
the United Nations Security Council, and its implications for the first
war crimes court since Nuremburg.

Q: Do you think it is possible to complete the war crimes trials before
the 2008 deadline set by the UN Security Council?

A: That much depends on how many new indictments the prosecutor will still
bring, and how many people will in fact be arrested or otherwise brought
for trial to The Hague. I am constantly watching the numbers and the
process. I think it's extremely important to maintain the legitimacy and
to protect the legacy of this tribunal in terms of a rational and orderly
conclusion or our work. We had a slow and painful beginning with few
defendants, not the kind we [or the prosecutor] would have chosen.

Having said that, cases such as [Dusko] Tadic [a low-level Bosnian Serb
convicted of killing Muslims] helped keep the tribunal alive. That period
allowed the tribunal, because the judges, relatively speaking, had more
time - unlike today's unrelenting pressure - to develop some seminal
jurisprudence. In the Tadic case they confirmed that the whole notion of
war crimes was applicable to non-international armed conflict. That's
quite a statement in international law.

Q: Do you think the judges are setting fewer precedents now because they
are under so much pressure?

A: No, it's just that [then] they could devote even more time to it. Now
we are working under much greater time constraints, but we have developed
an impressive model of an international criminal tribunal. We have six
trials a day, not always, but typically three in the morning and three in
the afternoon - as you know we have only three courtrooms.

>From these, an incredible body of jurisprudence is emerging on substantive
issues of international criminal law, and just as importantly, on
procedural and evidentiary questions such as the legality of the arrests,
demands to disqualify judges and many others. There is a tremendous range
of issues covered by jurisprudence of importance to the future functioning
of all international tribunals, including the International Criminal
Court, ICC.

Q: Are you satisfied with how things are progressing?

A: We still have some problems. The trials are still too long - this is in
a way the price we are paying for total compliance, on which I certainly
insist, with international due process and human rights. We give the
accused all the possible guarantees.

I would very much like to speed up the trials, and for the prosecutor to
be more selective in terms of the charges. We are a mature court, which
has developed predictable jurisprudence, and it should be much easier now
for the prosecutor to decide which particular crime to prosecute. We need
not always proceed under crimes against humanity, war crimes and even
genocide, but select the best possible statutory basis and on which we
have the best evidence, just as prosecutors in many countries would to
speed up the process. Justice delayed can sometimes be justice denied - we
have to move faster.

Q: Is there a way to speed up the trials?

A: Yes, with judicial reforms and more effective prosecutorial work. We
are trying to reform the rules of procedure to give the judges better
tools of trial management, [for example] encouraging judges to set a
number of limits [on time and witnesses].

Of course, trial management has to be flexible. The judges must be
responsive in particular circumstances and willing to give more time to
the prosecutor or allow more witnesses. But we must do our best to have
faster trials in the interests of both justice and efficiency.

Another area where we have adopted useful reforms is this: What happens
when the international community invests a tremendous amount of time,
money and effort in a case and one of our judges becomes sick or, God
forbid, dies? Or what if a judge on a case is a candidate for re-election
and is not re-elected? Are we to start all over? We can't be completely
dependent on the consent of counsel for a new judge to join the remaining
two judges on the panel.

We have now established a very well calibrated system of guarantees and
procedures which enable the case to go on with a new judge - two would
continue and one would join - and that judge would have to familiarise
himself with the case. Such a change of the bench would be subject to
automatic appeal to make sure the rights of the accused are respected.

Q: Will that be sufficient to help you meet the 2008 deadline?

A: We are going to try to comply with the dates mentioned by my
predecessor Claude Jorda to the Security Council in July 2002, but we
have to take into account that this year we have been very successful
in [bringing] some very prominent accused [to the tribunal].

Their trials are likely to be of considerable complexity and duration, and
when it comes to international justice, we can't do something quick or on
the cheap - judicial work must be properly done. Recent arrests have to be
factored in, and we still have lots of unknowns. The main imponderables
are [indicted fugitives] such as [Bosnian Serb leaders] Ratko Mladic and
Radovan Karadzic.

Q: But even if there are no new indictments issued between now and 2008,
there are still 20 or so war crimes suspects at large, and twice that
number in the detention unit. Will it be possible to try all of them?

A: If there are no new indictments I think the [overrun] would not be
dramatic, as the date 2008 for the conclusion of trials ... is not written
in stone. I am sure the international community wants us to do a good job.
As judges we have an obligation to the values that we uphold, to justice
and due process, and [cannot be] constantly looking at our watches. It
might [run over to] 2009, and of course there will be two or three years
for appeals after that. This has always been understood and been part of
the plan.

Q: Have you actually done the calculations - counted the number of accused
and the courtrooms and the judges you have to see if it's possible?

A: We are doing that constantly. To be able to comply with those dates it
is critical to have a more focused approach by the prosecution along the
lines of what I've indicated to you - and also for the judges to take a
very robust role in trial management.

We have been working very hard with the Peace Implementation Council under
Dayton.  Two weeks ago, I spent two days in Sarajevo and we are very
gratified by the fact that, after talks and negotiations that have gone on
for quite a long time, there has been a unanimous endorsement by the
council's steering board for the establishment of a special war crimes
chamber in the state court of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If everything goes well, the next step will be for [Bosnia-Herzegovina]
High Representative Paddy Ashdown and myself to present a report to the
Security Council in October and ask for its official approval. The plan
does not need to be endorsed for legal reasons, but the council would give
it stronger moral and political international support.

The plan represents a much greater utilisation of local or regional
courts. War crimes trials speak with much greater resonance when they are
held close to the victims. Now this has to be balanced by the greater
danger to witnesses so part of the plan is to develop an efficient system
of security and witness protections. We have made a good beginning and the
idea is that there will be a joint task force chaired by the Office of the
High Representative and the Bosnia-Herzegovina justice ministry.

It will establish a number of working groups to deal with the nitty-gritty
of legal procedures, protection and security. The tribunal will try to
facilitate this development.

The Sarajevo project is still dependent on [funding], but one thing should
be clear - it is not designed to accommodate high-level defendants. We
have to try those cases here at The Hague, as [they] would create too much
stress for the local environment.  Therefore the type of cases that we
would be able to transfer to Sarajevo would be cases of lower and
intermediate level suspects.

But I do not believe our tribunal can go out of business before we [have]
Mladic and Karadzic in custody and on trial. I think that our historical
mission on behalf of the international community will not have been
performed.

Q: Aside from the trial Chamber in Sarajevo, there are also efforts being
undertaken in Zagreb and Belgrade to convene local war crimes courts. Will
the tribunal be able to assist these other local efforts?

A: I would certainly encourage such developments so that local courts may
provide credible justice and be respectful of international human rights
and due process.

Q: Is there already a process where the tribunal can oversee such local
efforts?

A: We are a court of law and don't have a monitoring function, but we have
considerable influence through consultation. So far, we have limited
ourselves to the Sarajevo chamber because we have been given guarantees of
international standards. Each judicial panel in Sarajevo will consist of
one local and two international judges and this just shows the tremendous
sensitivity to ensure due process and proper procedures in such courts.

But the idea is to develop the judicial institutions and the rule of law
in the area, initially in Sarajevo, and eventually elsewhere. I understand
Belgrade is focusing on a war crimes chamber and this is good.

Stacy Sullivan is the IWPR project manager in The Hague.


BRIEFLY NOTED:

Compiled by Emir Suljagic and Stacy Sullivan in The Hague


SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO CUTTING IT FINE

Just days away from the deadline for the government of Serbia and
Montenegro to hand over transcripts of meetings between former Serbian
president Slobodan Milosevic and his closest allies, Hague prosecutors
have not yet received all the documents they asked for.

Tribunal judges had given Belgrade a month from June 6 to deliver the
material.

Prosecutors want to see records of meetings of the Supreme Defence
Council, the body which oversaw the Yugoslav army. These allegedly show
that Milosevic played a dominant role in the council during the wars in
Bosnia and Croatia.

The prosecutors said the documents would play a crucial role in the trial.
The government of Serbia and Montenegro has repeatedly promised to
cooperate fully in handing over any documentation.

Under tight deadlines to complete the trial, prosecutors are still hopeful
that the government will come up with the documents before it is too late.
If the notes are not handed over in time, the judges will no doubt have to
take the issue up again - and they may be running out of patience.


MILOSEVIC LAWYER GOES

It was announced this week that Branislav Tapuskovic, the Serbian lawyer
appointed appointed as "friend of the court" or amicus curiae for Slobodan
Milosevic, will be leaving. Tribunal officials said his departure was
part of a re-arrangement of priorities and a redefinition of the role of
amicus curiae.

"We didn't fire him," says tribunal spokesman James Landale. "We thanked
him for his services."

The eager Belgrade lawyer had often appeared more intent on representing
Serbia as a whole than Milosevic.

Earlier this week, Tapuskovic argued in court that Croatian Serbs had
been living in fear of "Operation Storm" - the summer 1995 offensive in
which Croatia took back Serb-held areas - since 1992.  Judge Richard May
interrupted, "Mr Tapuskovic, you are not here to defend Serbia."

Tapuskovic also began talking about the role Yugoslavia's history had
played in recent Balkan conflicts. When judge O-Gon Kwon asked him explain
what the legal significance of all this was, Tapuskovic was at a loss for
an answer.

The next day, the tribunal announced that Tapuskovic would be leaving.

Three remain in service - Steven Kay and Gillian Higgins, working from
The Hague, and Timothy McCormack who is providing legal analysis from
Australia.


WILL NASER ORIC BE RELEASED?

Naser Oric, the Bosnian Muslim commander from Srebrenica whose arrest
in April sparked protests both in Bosnia and at The Hague, appeared
before the court on July 1 seeking provisional release.

One of the reasons his lawyers cited was that Oric was unlikely to flee,
and did not pose a danger to society. They argued that he had cooperated
fully with the tribunal, having given 105 hours of interviews to war
crimes prosecutors.

Oric was arrested by NATO forces in Bosnia on April 10 and charged with
violations of the laws or customs of war.

Although Oric put up resistance when NATO forces showed up to arrest him,
allegedly beating up five soldiers, his lawyers say he had no idea he
was under indictment and would have turned himself in voluntarily if he
had known.

The prosecution, however, has sought continued custody, arguing that
he posed a grave danger to witnesses likely to testify against him.

The tribunal was told of two reports from Bosnian law enforcement
authorities detailing Oric's likelihood to interfere with witnesses
with "every means available, from force to bribery."

One of the documents attesting to the danger Oric posed was reportedly
presented to the defence just five minutes before the hearing began -
together with a second document contesting these allegations.

Discussion of these eleventh-hour documents took place in closed session,
so the press was not privy to their nature or contents. Oric's smile as
his lawyer presented the second document was, however, plain to see.

Whether he will await trial in the Scheveningen detention unit or at home
in Bosnia will now be decided by the judges.

Emir Suljagic is an IWPR reporter in The Hague. Stacy Sullivan is IWPR
project manager in The Hague.

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These weekly reports, produced since 1996, detail events and issues at the
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Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Senior
Editor: John MacLeod; Editor: Alison Freebairn; Hague Project Manager:
Stacy Sullivan; Translation: Djordje Tomic, Predrag Brebanovic, and
others.

The opinions expressed in Tribunal Update are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR.

ISSN 1477-7940 Copyright (c) 2003 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting

TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 318