Genocide Specialists' Come Back
The Serbs are unwilling to tolerate what they call Albanian impudence. The police units operating in Kosovo look more like combat soldiers, backed up by attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers.
Acording to The New York Times, some chilling reports say that Serb veterans of ethnic cleansing (a diplomatic euphemysm for genocide) are moving into the area. A Serbian gangster called Pjevac was seen in the Kosovo town of Mitrovica accompanied by a group of men from Arkan's Tigers or Serbian Volunteer Guard, a paramilitary group with deep experience in ethnic cleansing.
Another similar figure, Frenki Sematovic, disappeared from his training camp in the northern province of Vojvodina accompanied by 700 men, and was said to be headed for Kosovo, intent on quelling Albanian dissent.
Among those said to have carried out the massacres in Srebrenica and also in northern Bosnia this fall were the irregular forces Tigers commanded by Zeljko Raznjatovic, or "Arkan," the most notorious of the ethnic cleansers. Although he has committed atrocities in both Bosnia and Croatia, he is native to neither. He lives in Serbia proper, where he is a member of the Serbian Parliament closely tied to Milosevic. According to a variety of authorities, including the former staff secretary to the Serbian defense minister, Arkan's militia has been bankrolled by Milosevic's government, and Western intelligence sources say that Arkan has long been employed by the Serbian secret police.
Populations can be removed, even forcibly removed, without extreme bloodshed. Ethnic minorities could have been ejected from their homes, gathered at a central locations, and transported to another region. This, however, would have required a strong and well-organized regular army. The Bosnian Serb Army was neither numerically strong enough, nor sufficiently well-organized, especially in the first stages of the conflict in BiH, to accomplish this task. Thus, Serb officials relied on the use of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, rapes, and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbs had to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would flee the area and never return.
The character of «ethnic cleansing» was partly determined by its reliance on local officials and paramilitary leadership. Local officials relied on police and militia to help expel non- Serbs from Serb-controlled land, and these forces were often ill- equipped and untrained. The use of terror was their most efficient weapon. Police and local militia were frequently supplemented by paramilitaries. These groups often operated outside any discernable centralized command and control structure. Paramilitaries were often recruited from a population of rural, uneducated youth. Sometimes a deliberate effort was made to recruit those with criminal backgrounds. The apparent lack of control over paramilitaries conveyed the message that the most brutal acts would be permitted, or at least they would go unpunished.
The fragmentation of authority has provided FRY and Bosnian Serb officials with «plausible deniability». If ties between paramilitaries and officials are obscured, government officials might be able to evade responsibility for «ethnic cleansing». Thus, even after the JNA became better organized and able to assert greater control in 1993, it did not establish effective command and control over the paramilitaries.
While regular military units, militia, police and local citizens have all participated in «ethnic cleansing» campaigns. Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of «ethnic cleansing.» Two of the units that have played a major role in the «ethnic cleansing» campaign in BiH, the «Cetniks» associated with Vojislav Seselj and the «Tigers» associated with Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan), have been active in the Republic of Serbia as well. Seselj's followers have reportedly waged «ethnic cleansing» campaigns against ethnic minorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Arkan's «Tigers» have staged military training exercises allegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.
These paramilitary units have launched operations from within the Republic of Serbia. In addition, paramilitary training camps are located within the Republic of Serbia.
Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
established pursuant to security council resolution 780 (1992)
Annex III : The military structure, strategy and tactics of the warring factions
United Nations - Security Council,
S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I), 28 December 1994
The Origins of Arms
Chronology of events involving the acquisition of small arms and light weapons which is believed to be the main supply of Kosovo Liberation Army fighters
Macedonia: Organized Arms Smuggling
A large quantity of weapons, including 11 automatic, and two semi-automatic guns, a hunting rifle, six hand grenades and 1,177 pieces of ammunition from houses was seized by police in Gostivar, western Macedonia. Ten people were arrested on charges of illegal possession, including tow Albanian citizens. [" Macedonian Police Seize Arms Smuggled from Albania", Reuters, http://customnews.cnn.com, January 22, 1998]
Greece: Albanian Nationals Arrested
in Connection with Weapons Find
Two Albanian men were arrested in Dion, Pieria and charged with importation and possession of weapons, explosives and narcotic substances. They are thought to be connected with a large arms cache discovered by Katerini security police. The cache contained several anti-tank rockets and launchers, machine guns, Kalashnikov assault rifles, hand grenades, pistols and silencers, ammunition, masks and bullet-proof vests, as well as 153 sticks of TNT and two Uzi submachine guns believed to have been stolen form Greek police. The weaponry is thought to have been smuggled into Greece from Albania, but was mainly of Russian and Chinese origin. ["Albanians Charged in Connection With Greek Arms Find," Athens News Agency WWW in FBIS Daily Reports, FBIS-WEU-98-007, January 7, 1998]
Albania: Five People Killed in Elbasan
Groups of people, who had gathered outside the police station in Elbasan after a confrontation with the police, entered the building and broke open the arms, depot. At the same time, two other armories at military bases on the hill of Krasta and near the hospital were attacked and looted of all their weapons and ammunition. The shots from pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns continued all night, spreading panic throughout the city. Five people died in the frenzied gunfire. ["Albania: Elbasan Reported Out of Control,; Five Dead," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Bulgaria: Government Denies
Reports of Arms Smuggling
The Bulgarian government denied reports of Albanian traders selling pistols for $3 and Kalashnikovs for $7. The Security Services spokesman claimed it was ridiculous to sell weapons at such prices when the black-market for such weapons has never fallen below $300. Steps were taken to increase security on the border of Albania and Macedonia in order to prevent the import of illegal weaponry. ["Bulgaria: Pirin Security Service Denies Reports of Arms Smuggling," Sofia Trud in FBIS Daily Reports, FBIS-EEU-97-080, March 21, 1997]
Albania: Albanian Village Finds
Boom in Gun-Running
As Albania raced headlong into chaos last month, rioters ransacked Government weapons, storehouses, stealing hundreds of thousands of AK-47 assault rifles. In Gramsh, local residents involved in the arms trade said many of weapons were sold to Albanians in neighboring Macedonia or in the Kosovo area of Serbia. However, these townspeople had difficulty saying exactly where the weapons ultimately end up. The looters, treasure from Gramsh alone amounted to 110,000 assault rifles. Residents said some of the rifles had been stashed away by local people in the hope of selling them to other civilians in Albania. The town looked like a smuggler,s paradise; at the marketplace, the price for AK-47 varied from $20 to $40 apiece. ["Albania: Albania Village Finds Boom in Gun-Running," The New York Times, April 24, 1997]
Albania: Six Dead in Shkoder;
A wave of attacks on armories took place in the districts of Shkoder, Puke, and Malesia e Madhe. After an exchange of gunfire, individuals seized large quantities of weapons and ammunitions. People were killed or wounded in the exchanges of fire at the bases of Vau i Dejas, Kjerras, Malesia e Madhe, and Puke. According to the reports from the local defense staff in Puke one person died and eleven were wounded. In Malesia e Madhe there were eight injured including officers and soldiers, and in Shkoder there were six dead and an unknown number of wounded. ["Albania: Six Dead in Shkoder; Armories Looted," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Albania: Gunshots, Looting in Tirana
After the break-in at the armories of the Military Academy and military depot, gunshots from weapons of many different calibers were heard in Tirana into the night. Various eyewitnesses said that there were at least six dead and many wounded. ["Albania: Gunshots, Looting in Tirana; Airport Closes for 48 Hours," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Albania: Crowds Seize Weapons
From Durres Armories
In Durres, a group of people headed to the armories at Bisht i Palles where weapons of all kinds were seized. A wave of panic spread among the population, when some looters began to fire their guns into the air. ["Albania: Crowds Seize Weapons From Durres Armories," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Albania: Macedonian Farmers Claim
Albanians Selling Looted Weapons
There was complete chaos on the Albanian side of the border between Macedonia and Albania. Frequent bursts of fire from automatic rifles could be heard, while people were looting the border barracks and the border guards were fleeing. Macedonian farmers along the border claimed that the Albanians were offering them seized automatic weapons for 20 German Marks each. ["Albania: Farmers Claim Albanians Selling Looted Weapons," Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Albania: Military Units Attacked in Mjekes
A group of 20-30 people, who had come from the town of Cerrik, attacked a military sub-unit in the village of Mjekes, about 8 km from the Elbasan district. They later looted a large quantity of weapons from this sub-unit. Juveniles were reported to be part of the group. Two people from this group were killed by random gunfire. ["Albania: Salvation Committee Set Up in Cerrik To Control Situation," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-071, March 12, 1997]
Albania: Situation Out of Control in Gramsh
In the town of Gramsh, hordes of people entered state reserve warehouses and looted and set fire to the police commissariat. Meanwhile, in a nearby village of Mjekes, a military sub-unit came under attack by villagers who seized weapons and ammunition. The police intervened by isolating these peasants, some of whom handed over their weapons. ["Albania: Reports say Situation in Gramsh Out of Control,," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-071, March 12, 1997]
Albania: Chaotic Situation in Burrel
The situation in the town of Burrel remained chaotic. Hundreds of people from the town and nearby villages stormed the military units in suburbs of the town, looting different kinds of weapons and ammunition. The military forces were unable to face them. Sources from the hospital in the town confirmed that three people were injured by gunfire. ["Albania: ATA Reports Chaotic, Situation in Burrel 12 Mar," Tirana ATA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-072, March 13, 1997]
Albania: Weapons Looted
From Military Barracks in Elbasan
A group of youths looted weapons from military barracks and fired into the air in the Cerric town of the Elbasan District. Local inhabitants did not support them. ["Albania: Situation Reportedly Calm in Elbasan 12 Mar," Tirana ATA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-071, March 12, 1997]
Albania: Rebels Seize Arms in Mjeksi
Albanian insurgents seized and looted an armaments factory in Mjeksi, south of the capital Tirana. People from the nearby town of Shirgjan also took over an arms factory that produces weapons, munitions, and explosives. ["Albania: Insurgents Seize Arms Factory in Mjeksi," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-071, March 12, 1997]
Albania: President Berisha,s Supporters
Raid Weapons Depot
Albanians loyal to President Sali Berisha raided a major weapons depot in the northeastern town of Bajram Currin near the border with Serbia. About 9,000 people were involved in the raid. One person was slightly injured in a powerful blast of dynamite at another weapons depot in the town. ["Albania: Reports say 9,000 Involved in Pro-Berisha Arms Depot Raid," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-070, March 11, 1997]
Albania: President Berisha Loyalists
Raid Weapons Depot in Bajram Curri
Albanians loyal to President Sali Berisha raided a weapons depot in the northeastern town of Bajram Curri. ["Albania: Berisha Loyalists Raid Weapons Depot in Northern Town," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-070, March 11, 1997]
Albania: More Weapons Seized
Ten people were shot in the town of Berat after rioters seized arms from three army depots. Insurgents also looted weapons as they took over the nearby town of Skrapari. In Permiti, residents torched the police station. Armed rioters also took over Polican, located between Berat and Skrapari, which had a munitions factory. ["Albania: Rebels Now Control 11 Towns in South," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-069, March 10, 1997]
Albania: Situation Remains
Tense in Gjirokaster
In the town of Gjirokaster, where the population seized the armaments from an arms depot, many civilians were injured due to the uncontrolled use of looted weapons. In the Lazarat village, three people were wounded by gunfire. ["Albania: One Killed, Many Wounded in Firing in Gjirokaster," Tirana ATA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-068, March 9, 1997]
Albania: Military Units
attacked in Berat
Groups of people stormed the military unit in the town of Berat. They faced no resistance from the soldiers, and so they began to loot weapons and plunder the unit. The majority of the looters were 14-16 year olds. ["Albania: Groups Attack Military Unit in Berat, Seize Weapons," Tirana ATA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-068, March 9, 1997]
Albania: Police Station Looted
in Sarande City
An armed gang rioted the police station in Sarande where it looted about 400 weapons. The city,s authorities called on the local population to observe the law and turn in any weapons they posses. ["Albania: Gunfire Rarely Heard, in Sarande, Delvine 5 Mar," Tirana ATA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-065, March 6, 1997]
Albania: Rebels Seize Weapons
From Military Base in Sarande
The rebels attacked a marine base in Sarande and seized all the ammunition. Meanwhile, other groups rushed to the base depots, seizing various weapons, foodstuffs and equipment. A total of 2,000 weapons of different kinds were also seized. ["Albania: Terrorist Bands in Sarande Seize Arms From Base," Tirana Radio Tirana Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-062, March 3, 1997]
Albania: Military Base Attacked
The protesters managed to ransack the base of the Albanian military marine in Pashaliman in Orikum, 20 km south of Vlore. Thousand of weapons and ammunition were seized. The soldiers, the majority of whom were unarmed, were completely unable to cope with the situation. Fifteen persons were admitted to Vlore hospital, primarily children, who were wounded by stray bullets or accidental detonations of hand grenades. A fourteen-year-old child lost his legs from the explosion of a bomb in the street. On the same day, a group of adolescents succeeded in entering an army tunnel used as a depot and managed to seize large boxes of ammunition. ["Albania: ANSA Reports on Situation at Pashaliman Military Base," Tirana TVSH Television Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-97-061, March 2, 1997]
Training Camps in Albania and Turkey
UN Commission on Human Rights Thematic Reports
- Use of Mercenaries - Special Rapporteur's Report
E/CN.4/1995/29, 21 December 1994
74. The third meeting was with officials from the Federal Ministry of Defence, among whom were General Terzic, Colonel Nebojsa Savanovic and other officials, including a Mr. Tomo ...
75. General Terzic said that two United States mercenaries, Colton Glenn Perry and Pesa Nastazio Marin, had been handed over to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Belgrade on 8 August 1992. A German mercenary, Hans Kurt Reisinger, had been handed over on 25 September 1992 to the Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in Belgrade. The Federal Ministry of Defence also possessed a confession by the Netherlander Tilder. When the Special Rapporteur emphasized the need for documentary evidence to substantiate that the three aliens who had been expelled were mercenaries, he was told that there was a commission for the exchange of prisoners in the Ministry of Defence and that all such information was stored on computer. He was promised that the data would be retrieved and handed over to him. Regarding Tilder's confession, a French translation of his statement was sent to the Special Rapporteur. In reply to the Special Rapporteur's question about special training camps where, according to the communication of 12 July 1994, persons were being trained to fight against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. Tomo explained that these camps, which were located mainly in Albania and Turkey, were used to train Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija as well as Muslims from the Raska region to carry out commando operations and acts of terrorism within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The main purpose of such acts was allegedly to destabilize Kosovo and Sandzak. It was said that Albanian and Turkish officers were responsible for the training in the camps. The camps in Albania, where approximately 2,120 persons were being trained, were said to be located at Llabinot, Pishkopeja, Skadar and Llabinot-Elbasan. In Turkey, the camps, where some 2,000 were being trained, were reportedly situated in the vicinity of Ankara. The Special Rapporteur asked what had been done by the Yugoslav authorities in response to the allegations. He was informed that public trials were being held in Novi Pazar and Bijelo Polje and that when the trials ended, he would be given the case files. At the end of the meeting the participating officials reaffirmed that there had been mercenaries both in the Croatian ranks and in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when the Special Rapporteur emphasized the need for evidence, he was provided with copies of some of the documents in their possession.
Use of Mercenaries
UN Commission on Human Rights Thematic Reports
- Use of Mercenaries - Special Rapporteur's Report
E/CN.4/1996/27, 17 January 1996
"Regarding the armed conflicts which occurred on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is recommended that the Commission should reiterate its support for the investigation of the presence of mercenaries, foreign combatants, members of international brigades, volunteers, mujahidin and Islamic combatants in those conflicts and call for the immediate departure from those territories of the mercenaries still in the countries concerned. It is also recommended that the Commission welcome the Dayton Agreements and support the judicial investigations carried out by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague concerning persons charged with war crimes, and by a number of national jurisdictions concerning mercenaries charged with various offences and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights."
UN Commission on Human Rights Thematic Reports|
- Use of Mercenaries - Special Rapporteur's Report
E/CN.4/1996/27, 17 January 1996
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Item 7 of the provisional agenda
Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, submitted by Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/5 and Economic and Council resolution 1995/254
1. The General Assembly, in resolution 49/150 of 23 December 1994, inter alia, urged all States to take the necessary steps and to exercise the utmost vigilance against the menace posed by the activities of mercenaries and to ensure by legislative measures that their territory and other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, were not used for the recruitment, assembly, financing, training and transit of mercenaries or for the planning of activities designed to destabilize or overthrow the Government of any State, threaten the territorial integrity of sovereign States or to fight the national liberation movements struggling against colonial domination and foreign intervention or occupation. The General Assembly also urged all States to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur in the fulfilment of his mandate.
2. In resolution 1995/5 of 17 February 1995, the Commission on Human Rights, inter alia, reaffirmed that the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries should be considered offences of grave concern to all States (para. 1). The Commission urged all States to prevent mercenaries from using any part of their territory to destabilize any sovereign State (para. 2) and called upon all States that had not yet done so to consider taking early action to accede to or ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (para. 3). The Commission decided to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for three years (para. 4) and requested him to report to the Commission at its fifty-second session on his activities (para. 7). The Commission also urged all States to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur in the fulfilment of his mandate (para. 8), in particular by providing credible and reliable information (para. 5).
3. In decision 1995/254 of 25 July 1995, the Economic and Social Council approved the Commission's decision to extend for three years the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and requested the Secretary-General to provide him with all necessary assistance.
4. Pursuant to the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/5 and Economic and Social Council decision 1995/254, the Special Rapporteur has the honour to submit for consideration by the Commission his seventeenth report on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.
I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
A. Implementation of the programme of activities5. The Special Rapporteur submitted his report to the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1995/29) on 1 February 1995, at the 5th meeting of its fiftyfirst session. While in Geneva, the Special Rapporteur had consultations with representatives of various States and held meetings with members of nongovernmental organizations. He also held coordination meetings with the Centre for Human Rights.
6. The Special Rapporteur returned to Geneva on three occasions, from 29 May to 2 June 1995, from 31 July to 4 August 1995 and from 11 to 15 December 1995, in order to hold a number of consultations, to participate in the meeting of special rapporteurs and special representatives, independent experts and chairmen of working groups of the Commission on Human Rights, which took place from 29 to 31 May 1995, and to draft the reports to be submitted to the General Assembly and to the Commission.
7. The Special Rapporteur submitted his report to the General Assembly (A/50/390 and Add.1) on 16 October 1995.
B. Correspondence8. Pursuant to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 49/150 of 23 December 1994 and Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/5 of 17 February 1995, the Special Rapporteur sent a communication dated 8 May 1995 to all States Members of the Organization, requesting the following information:
"(a) Information relating to the possible existence of activities of mercenaries which, in violation of the sovereignty and laws of their countries, might have occurred or be occurring in their territory (recruitment, financing, training, assembly, transit or use of mercenaries);
(b) Information relating to the possible existence of activities of mercenaries in the territory of another country which impair or may impair the sovereignty of their State and the exercise of the right of their people to selfdetermination;
(c) Information relating to the possible existence of activities of mercenaries in their territory or in the territory of another State which are associated with the performance of illegal international acts such as terrorist attacks, drug and arms trafficking, smuggling and other activities which impair the constitutional stability of their Governments and the enjoyment of human rights by their population;
(d) Information relating to the possible existence of activities of mercenaries in the territory of another country which impair or may impair the sovereignty of other countries in their subregion, region or continent and the exercise of the right of other peoples to selfdetermination;
(e) Information on domestic legislation currently in force and international treaties to which their country is party relating to the prohibition of activities of mercenaries and their use as a means of violating the sovereignty of other States and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination;
(f) Their Government's position on the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 44/34 of 4 December 1989);
(g) Suggestions which, in their Government's opinion, might be useful in refining the international approach to the subject of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination."
9. The replies provided by Mr. Roberto Robaina González, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, by the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva, and by the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva were reproduced in the recent report by the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly (A/50/390, paras. 10, 11 and 9 respectively). In the addendum to that report (A/50/390/Add.1) the letters sent to the Special Rapporteur by Mr. Vartan Oskanian, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Mate Granic, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, and by Mr. Miroslav Milosevic, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Office at Geneva, were also reproduced.
10. The Special Rapporteur also received replies from the Governments of Ecuador (1 June 1995), Laos (8 June 1995), Latvia (29 May 1995), Mexico (11 July 1995), Myanmar (24 July 1995), Namibia (22 June 1995), Palau (3 July 1995), San Marino (31 May 1995) and Uruguay (6 June 1995).
11. The communications from the Governments of Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay referred, inter alia, to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Uruguay also described those provisions of its domestic legislation which could be applicable to the suppression of mercenary activities.
12. Subsequent to the preparation of his report to the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur was informed of a note verbale, dated 28 July 1995, addressed to the Centre for Human Rights by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chad. The note verbale reads as follows:
"Chad has had bitter experience of mercenaries on account of its territorial conflict with Libya and the civil war engendered by that conflict. Those wars were responsible for the loss of more than 40,000 lives.
Chad is anxious to preserve good neighbourly relations and to refrain from interfering in domestic affairs; accordingly it deplores the support given by certain countries to opposition movements which constitute a danger to security. It goes without saying that opposition movements are frequently accompanied by arms and drug trafficking and by smuggling.
With regard to points (e), (f) and (g) of the above note, subsequent to the National Sovereign Conference, Chad made a commitment to settle armed conflicts by peaceful means. It also prohibited anyone from resorting to force to gain power.
Chad fully subscribes to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 December 1989.
Regarding measures to be taken, Chad is in favour of severe sanctions, ranging from boycott to military action and economic embargo, against countries that use mercenaries as a means of violating human rights.
As to the suggestions requested in the note, all flashpoints in domestic or external conflicts should be identified, investigations carried out and information obtained."
13. The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Nepal to the United Nations Office at Geneva transmitted to the Centre for Human Rights a note verbale dated 25 August 1995, in which it stated:
"(a) No mercenary activities have been recorded in Nepal that violate her sovereignty and the law of the land.
(b), (c) and (d)
There is no information of mercenary activities in any country which affect the sovereignty of Nepal.
(e) There is no domestic legislation in or treaties signed with any country by Nepal that undermine the sovereignty of any State or the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.
(f) His Majesty's Government of Nepal has taken a positive view on the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the Convention is under its consideration.
(g) His Majesty's Government of Nepal respects the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination in all countries, and opposes the violation of human rights in any country through the use of mercenaries. At the same time, it would like to point out that a treaty between two States for the use and employment of manpower on a reciprocal basis should be taken into consideration in this respect."
14. In a note verbale dated 10 August 1995, the Permanent Mission of Paraguay to the United Nations Office at Geneva transmitted to the Centre for Human Rights a document containing information prepared by the Directorate-General for Human Rights subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and Labour. According to that document, no mercenaries are recruited, financed, trained, assembled or used in Paraguay or pass through the country in transit. Nor is the Government of Paraguay aware of mercenary activities in other countries that might or do affect the exercise by the people of Paraguay of their right to self-determination. According to the document, the question of mercenaries "is irrelevant to the present circumstances and history of the Republic of Paraguay". The recently adopted Constitution (approved on 20 June 1992) stipulates in article 42, in fine, that "Secret associations and associations of a paramilitary nature are prohibited". Article 172 of the Constitution states that the forces of law and order consist exclusively of the military and police forces. In addition, article 126 states that political parties and movements may neither receive economic aid, orders or instructions from foreign organizations or States, nor establish structures which, directly or indirectly, entail the use or advocacy of violence as a political instrument.
15. The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, sent the Special Rapporteur the following letter dated 23 October 1995:
"Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to you concerning the letter dated 30 June 1995 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia addressed to you (A/50/390/Add.1). Since the letter contains allegations that misrepresent the role of the army of Yugoslavia, for the sake of truth I have the honour to state the following.
The above unsubstantiated claims of the Croatian side represent yet another attempt to discredit the peaceful policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly at a time when my country is making a constructive contribution in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in the previous Yugoslavia.
The units of the army of Yugoslavia have not at any time left the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nor threatened the territorial integrity of its neighbours, including that of Croatia as well.
No military material, weapons or military equipment was sent to the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Only humanitarian and medical assistance was rendered.
The army of Yugoslavia did not take part or engage in mobilization for the army of the RSK. Military officers, born in the territory of the RSK, whose names were contained in the letters of the Croatian representatives to the Secretary-General, were already discharged from the army of Yugoslavia. Since they were born in the territory of the RSK, they joined their army to defend their ancestral homes.
By levying the charges against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia is covering up the involvement of its own regular troops in the military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the latest aggression against the Republic of Srpska."
16. In a letter dated 31 October 1995, the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Vladimir Pavicevic, sent the Special Rapporteur the following information compiled by his Government:
"(a) The presence of mercenaries within the Bosnian Muslim army and their activities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been registered in the following locations: the village of Biljosevo (between Kakanj and Zenica), Tuzla, Sarajevo, Vucilovac (bridgehead Orasje), Zenica, Travnik, the village of Mehuric (municipality of Travnik), Zeljezno Polje (north of Zenica), Kakanj, Zivinice, Nemili, Bistricak, Arnauti (the villages in the vicinity of Zenica), the village of Dobrinja near Kakanj, the Banovici, the village of Kalosevac near Tesanj, the settlement of Nedzarici in Sarajevo, Zavidovici, Buzim (western Bosnia), Gradacac, the village of Bistrac near Tuzla, the settlement of Dobrinja 3 in Sarajevo, the village of Zorovici on Mount Igman, Konjic and Mostar.
(b) The existence of the following units consisting mainly of mercenaries from the Islamic countries ( mujahidin ) and a small number of local extremists has been established:
International brigade in Pazaric, comprising about 600 mercenaries, predominantly from Islamic countries, with a small number of criminals from Germany, France and other European countries. Members of this brigade carried out the subversive action on 23 August 1994, in the village of Babin Do on Mount Igman, killing three and capturing two Bosnian Serb soldiers;
A company-strength unit is engaged in combat operations within the 37th division (Tesanj), most frequently in the direction of the village of Kalosevici-Vitkovci;
A reconnaissance/subversive detachment within the 32nd division (Zavidovici) participated in all offensive actions in the direction of southern parts of Mt. Ozren;
A company-strength unit deployed in the area of the village of Bistricak (broader area of the headquarters of the 33rd division) has participated in all offensive actions of this division in the direction Sarici-Blatnica-Teslic;
A reconnaissance/subversive detachment ( El Mujahidin ) based in the village of Mehuric has been active within the 7th Bosnian Muslim army corps in the area of Mt. Vlasic;
A reconnaissance/subversive company-platoon deployed in the area of Banovici took part in offensive actions in the direction of Vozuca;
Iranian Revolutionary Guard battalion sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1994 with large quantities of weapons and military equipment. The battalion participated in the planning and carrying out of individual terrorist actions in the territory controlled by the Bosnian Muslim army with the aim of enforcing and strengthening fundamentalist rule and liquidating disobedient Muslims and war criminals ;
El Fatah unit numbering 150 terrorists quartered in the settlement of Bistrik in Sarajevo;
Dervish Order , in Sarajevo, numbering about 70 terrorists;
Suleiman Fatah unit numbering about 50 terrorists, active in one area of the settlement of Dobrinja in Sarajevo and Pazaric;
Al Fatah unit numbering about 50 terrorists, active in the settlement of Nedzarici in Sarajevo;
Musafiri , numbering about 100 terrorists, located in the area of Ruzim, western Bosnia;
Black Mambas , numbering about 100 terrorists, engaged in offensive operations in the area of Gradacac;
Shehits , mercenaries from Pakistan and Kuwait, numbering about 70 terrorists, active from the area of Tuzla;
Allah's Followers , numbering about 150 terrorists, active in the zone controlled by the First Corps of the Bosnian Muslim army.
(c) In addition to the units consisting predominantly of mercenaries, groups of mercenaries or individuals from foreign countries are taking part in the following regular units of the Bosnian Muslim army:
Seventh Brigade, based in Zenica, used exclusively for offensive operations;
Fourth Light Brigade from Konjic ( Muderiz ), used exclusively for offensive operations;
Special unit of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, named Swallows , is engaged in offensive operations in the zones of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 7th corps;
First brigade, named Black Swans , based in Kakanj;
The following special units located in Zenica: Manoeuvre , Cancar , Guerilla , Green Legion and Jimbo .
(d) Mujahidin who are participating in the units of mercenaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina are recruited mainly in Islamic countries (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, etc.) but also in Western European countries (France and Germany in particular). In addition to the intelligence services of those Islamic countries, the intelligence services of some other countries, such as Albania, Austria, Croatia and Slovenia, also participate in the recruitment of mujahidin and their transfer to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Training centres have been set up in Slovenia, where mercenaries have received training before being dispatched to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Mosque in Zagreb, headed by Sefko Omerbasic, directly cooperates with the organizers and those who recruit mujahidin and dispatch them to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The activities of mujahidin in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are coordinated by one Abu Aziz, who acts as commander of mujahidin. It is also known that command posts in mercenary units are held by the following mujahidin: Abu Aiman, Hajibi, Mazan Ali Fussain, Nasser Al Niva, Abdullah Al Suvajid, Abdul Aziz Al Sead, Al Kihasheb."
II. LOCATION OF MERCENARY ACTIVITIES17. Throughout the first 50 years of its existence, the work done by the United Nations to promote peace, collective security and the defence of human rights has been arduous, frequently misunderstood and opposed in places where violence and armed conflict have intermittently prevailed. Violence in contemporary society has undermined fundamental rights such as the right to life, liberty and physical integrity and the rights of peoples. Violence, in conjunction with intolerance, has led to the outbreak of numerous armed conflicts throughout the second half of the twentieth century. So many millions have been killed or maimed, or are missing, refugees, internally displaced or orphaned, that the situation as a whole has repercussions on international peace, and makes it incumbent on the United Nations to strengthen its activities to ensure world peace and security.
18. The numerous references to such situations in the Special Rapporteur's reports are due to the observed fact that, in most cases, there is a close connection between such conflicts, the way in which they come about and the use of mercenaries by one or all of the parties involved in the conflict. This should be borne in mind by United Nations bodies, since the presence of mercenaries in armed conflicts tends to make them longer-lasting, more serious and bloodier. Admittedly, the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries has yet to come into force, but none the less, despite the provisions of article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, mercenaries are very actively involved in armed conflicts or are entrusted with actively encouraging them, depending on the aims and interests of those who hire and finance them.
19. This statement is neither gratuitous nor exaggerated; it is based upon proven incidents in a number of armed conflicts. Mercenaries exist and operate as groups of professionals selling their skill in war and violence. Whether individually or through criminal organizations, mercenaries perpetrate acts of violence which ruin human lives, cause material losses and hamper economic activity; they also carry out terrorist attacks, which more than once have touched off or aggravated conflicts, with catastrophic results for the peoples affected by them. Mercenary activities have been duly confirmed in various armed conflicts, and also in acts of international terrorism; regardless of the form they take, they are unlawful and punishable. There are international standards, resolutions and declarations by the organs of the United Nations whose purpose is to define a type of human behaviour as mercenary and to condemn it accordingly. Any inadequacy or discrepancy in the interpretation of the existing rules should be invoked not as justifying mercenary acts and behaviour, but as calling for increased clarification, precision and refinement of the standards of national and international law to combat the activities of mercenaries.
20. Mercenaries generally deny that this is what they are, claiming altruistic, ethnic, nationalistic, ideological or religious motives in order to disguise the true nature, according to international law, of their role. In reality, these arguments are applicable in the case of volunteers, linked altruistically to a cause they consider just but cannot properly be invoked by a mercenary. Ideological factors, the concept of "professional soldier" and psychological fixations may play a part in his personal make up but in concrete terms, it is all a question of money, pay and lack of scruples, which add up to the hallmark of the mercenary. Mercenary activity is paid. Hired mercenaries attack and kill for financial gain, in a country or conflict which is alien to their own nationality. The historical record, the complaints which have been submitted and the cases of mercenary activity which have been analysed by the Special Rapporteur show that the mercenary is an expert in warfare and in the illicit or even criminal activities for which he is hired and receives a considerable sum of money. He usually adopts ideologies which are extremist, radical and distinctly intolerant, but he commits criminal acts against the most basic rights of persons and peoples because he is directly motivated by financial gain.
21. In addition, it should be mentioned that mercenaries, and those organizations that enrol and train mercenaries in order to supply them on what is a criminal market, are directly related to unlawful international aims of Governments, which never act openly and will never acknowledge their responsibility in the hiring of mercenaries. However, the absence of a public and official admission does not prevent the truth from being known. The mercenary is the resource used in order to avoid being identified as the aggressor or participant in an internal conflict, or as the instigator and perpetrator of a criminal attack in a third country.
A. Armed conflicts and mercenary activities22. Armed conflicts, wherever they may occur, undermine peace and should be avoided. The armed conflicts that have taken place during the second half of the twentieth century have been among the main concerns of the United Nations, since they have affected its mission of maintaining peace, friendship and cooperation among States. In addition, armed conflicts threaten the political stability of constitutional Governments and inflict serious damage on the economies of the countries concerned; they lead to recession and poverty, and are generally accompanied by massive human rights violations. The phenomenon of mercenary activity is most clearly apparent in the context of armed conflict. It has been noted that, in situations of armed conflict, professional soldiers whose job situation has deteriorated or fails to meet their expectations in terms of income may accept proposals that turn them into mercenaries. Today, it is impossible to deny the existence of private entities and public bodies which, under a legal cover, conduct clandestine criminal operations as a parallel activity by hiring people who, in exchange for payment, agree to participate in the perpetration of unconscionable and illegal acts.
23. Although involvement in armed conflict is the best known form of mercenary activity, it would be a mistake to believe that the latter is confined to such situations. In fact, this illicit activity takes a variety of forms. For example, a mercenary may lend his services for the perpetration of criminal acts on behalf of a particular Power or group that wishes to cause damage in another country while using the person recruited to cover its tracks. There have also been infamous cases in which State intelligence authorities or security forces, opposition groups, armed domestic resistance movements or criminal organizations hire mercenaries to engage in illegal actions such as forming paramilitary forces for purposes of repression, organizing death squads or providing military protection for illicit drugtrafficking, smuggling or arms-trafficking, etc.
24. Organizations that recruit such persons work with government agents or with groups that are parties to a conflict, making the necessary connections and helping to establish a criminal alliance between recruiter and recruit. In some cases, legal devices are used to conceal the nature of the assignment or to make the mercenary appear to be a national of the country in whose armed conflict he is involved. Although the use of such a device conceals the mercenary's real status, information such as the origin of the contractual relationship, the payment, the type of services agreed upon and the simultaneous use of other nationalities and passports may serve as evidence in establishing the true nationality of persons involved in an armed conflict who are justifiably suspected of being mercenaries.
25. In the years immediately following the Second World War and at a time of decolonization throughout the world, mercenaries mainly operated in Africa, where they were used to prevent countries from achieving independence, to foment secession and to protect the apartheid regime. There is evidence indicating that there are still many mercenaries in Africa. Today, mercenary activities are associated not with a particular continent but with the existence of armed conflicts and of State or private forces all over the world which do not hesitate to use this instrument to achieve specific criminal aims.
26. Generally speaking, mercenaries are former soldiers who compulsively identify with the job of making war, pretend to be fanatical practitioners of a given ideological option and are usually intrinsically intolerant or violent. The aggravating factor is that their participation is linked to the bloodiest aspects of a conflict and to crimes against human rights. Moreover, the financial considerations and desire for illicit gain through looting which are associated with their participation may be decisive in prolonging the conflict. The mercenary's interest lies not in peace and reconciliation but in war, since that is his business and his livelihood. This is why, when wars end or become scarce, mercenaries tend to involve themselves in other illegal activities.
27. The Special Rapporteur's previous reports have referred to foreign mercenaries involved in actions to destabilize constitutional Governments or in drug or arms-trafficking or international terrorism. Although these reports do not claim to establish a classification of mercenary activities, it is important to take into account the wide range of situations in which this phenomenon is observed, since it affects the sovereignty, self-determination, stability and security of States, as well as the human rights of their inhabitants.
28. The activities normally assigned to mercenaries may be carried out by nationals or by foreigners who live in the country concerned. A point at issue is whether their illicit activities, which can do serious harm to a country or Government, should be considered mercenary if recruitment, training and payment are involved. Currently, despite these factors, cases such as these are not considered to involve mercenary activities as such, but acts that can be prosecuted as ordinary offences under the relevant domestic legislation. According to international provisions on the question, foreign nationality is a prerequisite for classifying an offender as a mercenary. In any case, the possibility of changing this criterion should be analysed and debated with a view to revising current international provisions on the subject. In the light of experiences where nationality has been used to mask the mercenary nature of illicit activities engaged in by a Power that recruits, prepares and pays an individual to perpetrate a criminal act against another country, its Government, its property or a given sector of its population.
29. According to this criterion, an irregular armed group engaging in terrorism may easily become a mercenary group by travelling to the territory of a neighbouring State in order to cover and give protection to a gang of drug traffickers, or to occupy a portion of foreign territory, removing it from the authority of the sovereign State. Situations such as these have been observed in recent decades. Likewise, there may be cases in which paid assassins or gangs of criminals are hired to commit crimes outside the territory of the State whose government agents recruit them to act against its own nationals, but cannot be classified as mercenaries under the legislation of the country in which the crimes are committed. However, this would not prevent the act of the recruiters from being classified as illegal payment of mercenaries to perpetrate acts which are prohibited and punishable under international law. In all these respects, there is a vacuum in the criminal legislation of most countries. This vacuum facilitates prohibited operations that involve mercenaries.
B. Cooperation among States in
30. The next few paragraphs contain information and analyses that
may serve as a basis for formulating policies to prevent and combat