2500 years after Sun Tzu So called independent journalists

Sun Tzu (500 BC): The Use Of Spies CIA: The Use Of Journalists

Council on Foreign Relations "The Future of U.S. Intelligence" Making Intelligence Smarter " Thus, what enables the wise commander to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men." " Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:   (1) Local spies- Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of an enemy territory;   (2) Moles- Having moles means making use of officials of the enemy;   (3) Double agents- Having double agents means getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes;   (4) Doomed spies- Having doomed spies means doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy;   (5) Surviving spies- Surviving spies means are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp." " When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the commander's most precious faculty. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other fields should greater secrecy be preserved." " (1)Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity;   (2)They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straight forwardness;   (3)Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports;   (4) Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of warfare;   (5)If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told." Sun Tzu (500 BC): The Use Of Spies " The recommendations of this Task Force fall under three headings: measures to improve the intelligence product, suggestions for internal reorganization, and steps to build or rebuild relationships with important external constituencies. " Improving the Product " The best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high quality analysts into the process. Analysis would be improved by increasing the flow of talented people into the intelligence community from outside the government. Greater provision should be made for lateral and mid-career entry of such analysts as well as for their short-term involvement in specific projects. Closer ties between universities and the intelligence community is desirable in this regard. Careerists would benefitfrom greater opportunities to spend time in other departments and nongovernmental organizations, including those involved in commerce and finance. " Internal Changes " The most important function for the clandestine services is the collection of human intelligence, that is, espionage. Such intelligence can complement other sources and, especially in closed societies, be the principal or sole source of information. In so doing, it will at times prove necessary to associate the United States with unsavory individuals, including some who have committed crimes. This is acceptable so long as the likely benefits for policy outweigh the moral and political costs of the association. " Building and Rebuilding Critical Relationships " Intelligence is not an end in itself Its ultimate purpose is to inform policymakers or military operators. Intelligence can do this in several ways. Intelligence supplements information that is available from open sources (newspapers, speeches, broadcasts) or diplomatic contacts. The contribution can be raw (a field report, a transcript of a conversation, a photograph) or refined (an analysis from secret as well as open source materials).Indeed, one of the most important functions of various components of the intelligence community is to provide analysis gleaned from all sources, open and secret, and to package it in a timely and useful manner to policymakers and other U.S. government or even nongovernmental actors. " Background " INTELLIGENCE IS INFORMATION not publicly available, or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for policymakers or other actors inside the government. What makes intelligence unique is its use of information that is collected secretly and prepared in a timely manner to meet the needs of policymakers. " " The total amount spent each year on intelligence for the U.S. government is classified but has been reported to be approximately $28 billion. The CIA is one of the smaller components, receiving roughly $3 billion or just over ten percent of the resources the United States spends on intelligence. The lion's share of the financial and human resources devoted to intelligence comes under Defense Department programs devoted to intelligence collection in general and support for military operations in particular. " " The collection of intelligence can be accomplished in a variety of ways, the most important being the interception of communications and other signals (SIGINT), satellite photography or imagery (IMINT), and reports from human sources (HUMINT).There is also measurement and signature intelligence, or MASINT, which enhances understanding of physical attributes of intelligence targets. Intelligence analysis reflects conclusions or judgments reached by individuals with access to information from many sources, of which secret information made available by intelligence community collection systems is only part. " " Covert action is fundamentally different from intelligence collection and analysis. It is intelligence used as an instrument of foreign policy. Such actions seek to influence the political, economic, or military situation in a foreign country without revealing American involvement in the activity.AS a result, the CIA is divided into several directorates, the two principal ones being for the production of analysis and for conducting clandestine operations, including intelligence collection, counterintelligence abroad, and covert action. " Collection priorities " What, then, are the higher priorities likely to be for intelligence collection-but not necessarily for national security policy-in the foreseeable future? We would list the status of nuclear weapons and materials throughout the former Soviet Union; political and military developments in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; potential terrorism against U.S. targets in the continental United States and overseas; unconventional weapons proliferation; and political-military developments in China. A second category of important but somewhat lower priority intelligence targets would include political developments in Russia and relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics; Mexican stability; the stability of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; Indo-Pakistani relations; developments affecting Middle East peace negotiations; and the activities of international criminal organizations. Political and military developments in Bosnia and the Balkans would necessarily be a high priority if the U.S. military were involved significantly.We would not include on this list such subjects as environmental protection, population growth, or general political and economic developments where open sources are normally sufficient. " " The above list (or any such list) is necessarily illustrative, as near-term priorities can change at any moment. Recent experience has shown that unexpected developments in areas of low inherent significance to U.S. national security can suddenly assume considerable but still temporary importance to policymakers. The correct response to such cases is not to expect the intelligence community to be prepared for everything, everywhere. This would waste resources, leave high-priority targets with inadequate coverage, and still not be enough given the unlimited potential for the unexpected. Instead, the president and the DCI should consider creating a formal intelligence reserve corps for dealing with so-called "pop-up" issues. Such a corps could consist of former intelligence professionals, academics, and others with particular geographic and functional expertise. Working with a point of contact in the intelligence community, they would be asked to collect data, provide reports, and be available to work full time if a crisis suddenly developed in their area and if their expertise were required." " But better analysis will also require reducing the isolation of the intelligence community. A greater flow of talented people into the agency from academia and business is essential.Greater provision ought to be made for lateral and mid-career entry as well as for short-term entry (measured in weeks, months, or years) or even for just a single, short-duration project. In this way the intelligence community could attract and exploit some of the best minds from academia and other sections of society that would otherwise not be available." Clandestine activities " Clandestine operations for whatever purpose currently are circumscribed by a number of legal and policy constraints. These deserve review to avoid diminishing the potential contribution of this instrument.At a minimum, the Task Force recommended that a fresh look be taken at limits on the use of nonofficial "covers" for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine activities. In addition, rules that can prohibit preemptive attacks on terrorists or support for individuals hoping to bring about a regime change in a hostile country need to be assessed periodically. " "The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led way and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies." " It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy." Sun Tzu (500 BC): The Use Of Spies   " A second task for the clandestine services is covert action, that is, the carrying out of operations to influence events in another country in which it is deemed important to hide the hand of the U.S. government. Historically, covert action has included such activities as channeling funds to selected individuals, movements or political parties, media placements, broadcasting, and paramilitary support.Such operations can be designed to bolster the capabilities of friendly governments in dealing with challenges to them and their societies. Covert measures can also have the opposite purpose, to weaken a hostile government. The capability to undertake these and other tasks-be it to frustrate a terrorist action, intercept some technology or equipment that would help a rogue state or group build a nuclear device, or assist some group trying to overthrow a leadership whose actions threaten U.S. interests-constitutes an important national security tool, one that can provide policymakers a valuable alternative or complement to other policies, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention. "