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Spy Satelite Images of War in Bosnia War Crimes in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina Corona
Arms Deliveries to Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mail & Guardian (gopher)
SA's leading
investigative newspaper

News and Archives

Arms smuggling
from South Africa to Croatia during the war
South Africa' s arms dealing underworld

Revealed where South Africa can sell arms

The European Union arms embargo
on the former Yugoslavia

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

On 5 July 1991 the European Community and its Member States decided to impose an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.
In September 1991 the United Nations Security Council decided to establish an arms embargo applied to all of the territory of the former Yugoslavia in UNSC resolution 713 (Sept. 25 1991).
In February 1996 the EU member States modified their total embargo, adopting a Common Position by which export licence applications to Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Fyrom) shall be considered on a case-by-case basis.
In March 1988 a new Common Position was outlined according to which the embargo was extended so that not only conventional arms but also equipment "which might be used for internal repression or for terrorism" was embargoed.
In August 1998 a new Common Position was agreed which lifted the agreed restrictions on arms tranfers to Slovenia.

Here (below) are the shortcuts to Mario's choice of The Federation of American Scientists World Wide Web documents. The Federation of American Scientists is engaged in analysis and advocacy on science, technology and public policy for global security. A privately-funded non-profit policy organization whose Board of Sponsors includes over 55 American Nobel Laureates, FAS was founded as the Federation of Atomic Scientists in 1945 by members of the Manhattan Project who produced the first atomic bomb. The Federation of American Scientists World Wide Web homepage, "The Best U.S. Intelligence Web Site" (Maintained by John Pike) hosts its various projects.

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    Arms Deliveries to Croatia and
    Bosnia and Herzegovina

    91089:Bosnia - Former Yugoslavia
    and U.S. Policy



    93056:Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations
    94029: Chemical Weapons
    Convention: Issues for Congress

    Texts on prevention of outer space arms race,
    illicit arms transfer, among drafts
    approved by First Commitee

    [15 Nov 1995] GA/DIS/3040

    95018: Intelligence Issues
    and the 104th Congress

    Security Strategy for Europe and NATO
    National Defense Authorisation Act
    for fiscal year 1996

    National Defense Authorization Act
    for fiscal year 1997

    (Senate - June 18, 1996)

    Congress 1996 Intelligence Debate
    Senate Resolution 225
    Relative to Bosnia and Herzegovina

    Arms Shipments to Bosnia
    from Islamic countries

    Pentagon Report Predicts
    Bosnia will Fragment without vast Aid


    Establishing Select Subcommittee to Investigate
    United States role in Iranian Arms Transfers
    to Croatia and Bosnia

    Third Country Arms Deliveries
    to Bosnia and Croatia

    -- Hon. Lee H. Hamilton

    Richard Holbrooke on Iranian Arms to Bosnia NewsHour Online
    MAY 21, 1996

    Excerpts from the Senate investigation of the U.S. role in supporting arms shipments from Iran to the Bosnian Muslims during their war with the Serbs. President Clinton has admitted he knew of the transfers but did nothing to discourage them, even though the United Nations had slapped an embargo on such shipments. Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence questioned former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, who said the U.S. policy towards the arms shipments was already in place when he became the State Department's point man on Bosnia in September 1994.

    Report of the U.S. Senate
    Select Committee on Intelligence

    January 4, 1995 to October 3, 1996

    The Committee's staff reviewed substantial material provided by the CIA and the NSA and smaller, but significant, amounts of material provided by the Department of State and Department of Defense (including finished intelligence products of the Defense Intelligence Agency), as well as some National Security Council (NSC) documents. The Chairman and Vice Chairman were also briefed by NSC staff personnel on some documents that the Executive branch refused to show to Committee staff.
    On November 7, 1996, the Committee issued a public report summarizing its findings and recommendations in this matter. The report's findings included the following:
    The decision to let Croatia transship Iranian and other arms to the Bosnian Muslims was made by the President and was implemented largely by Department of State and NSC personnel. Unusual steps were taken to keep this action secret, such as refraining from filing cables on it or from mentioning it at NSC meetings. These steps kept knowledge of this significant policy change from other agencies, including the Department of Defense and the CIA.

    Although the executive branch did inform appropriate committees of intelligence information on the arms flows, it did not inform Congress of the decision to let Croatia transship Iranian and other arms to the Bosnian Muslims. This action left Congress dangerously ignorant of U.S. policy, even as it debated and voted on legislation regarding enforcement of the arms embargo.

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    CIA officials became attentive to actions that might constitute an illegal covert action activity, which CIA personnel feared was under way. CIA's concerns may have been overwrought, but so are the allegations that CIA was ``spying on'' Department of State personnel. Much confusion might have been averted if Deputy Secretary Talbott or other State Department officials had adequately explained to DCI Woolsey the new policy and their intent that Iranian arms be permitted to flow to Bosnia and Croatia. It would also have helped if State Department Headquarters had provided clearer instructions to Ambassador Galbraith.

    Go to Mario's GREN LIGHT page!

    The decision to let Croatia transship Iranian and other arms to the Bosnian Muslims achieved its purpose of affecting the balance of forces in the former Yugoslavia without prompting European actions that the United States had feared would breed a wider and bloodier war. But Iran maintained and probably increased its influence in Bosnia as a result of its resumed role as Bosnia's major arms supplier. In addition, Croatian officials for a time found it hard to reconcile U.S. support of Iranian arms flows to Bosnia with continued U.S. support for other United Nations arms embargoes (such as that against Libya) and opposition to Iranian support for terrorism.

    Ambassador Redman may not have intervened with Croatian officials to secure release of a Bosnian convoy in May 1994, contrary to the IOB's conclusion that he probably did so.

    Executive branch personnel in senior overseas positions did not always understand the law and regulations governing covert action programs. Covert action options were prepared by Executive branch agencies in 1994 and 1995, but no covert action program for Bosnia was approved by the Executive branch. CIA consistently opposed undertaking such a program.

    Some Executive branch officials made statements to Bosnian and/or Croatian officials in the summer and fall of 1994 that suggested support for increased covert shipments of arms to the Bosnian Muslims. The Committee could not determine whether U.S. officials offered either support in implementing a larger arms pipeline or a quid pro quo to Croatia for agreeing to such increased arms shipments. The Committee found no evidence that the United States ever provided such support or any quid pro quo to Croatia, or encouraged any country other than Croatia to provide arms or military assistance in violation of the arms embargo.

    In early 1995, one U.S. official told a Croatian official that the United States did not want Croatia to discontinue a military resupply effort in Bosnia. In the summer of 1995, U.S. personnel inspected rockets bound for Bosnia; the Committee could not determine whether this activity was undertaken for the purpose of encouraging Croatia to continue the covert arms shipments.

    The Committee could not agree on whether the actions of U.S. officials constituted covert action under section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947. It did conclude, however, that the interchange between the United States Ambassador to Croatia and the President of Croatia in April 1994 did not constitute traditional diplomatic activity, at least as that term is understood by most Americans. The Committee disagreed, moreover, with the Executive branch view that diplomatic requests to third parties to conduct covert action are not covered by the definition of covert action. It also noted that any encouragement of promotion of arms shipments to Bosnia could violate Executive Order 12846, 58 FR 25771 (April 25, 1993) on sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Allegations regarding U.S. military or CIA involvement in the arms flow or in logistical support to the Bosnian Army appear to be false. The Committee found three areas in which administrative or legislative actions appear to be required:

    Recommendation No. 1: The Executive branch, especially the White House and the Department of State, should make a written record of every significant foreign policy decision, and especially of those decisions that reflect a change in policy; and it should ensure that adequate mechanisms are in place to generate and protect communications that are particularly sensitive.

    Recommendation No. 2: The Executive branch should keep the Committee ``fully and currently informed'' of the substantive content of intelligence that is collected or analyzed by U.S. intelligence agencies. Recommendation No. 3: The Executive branch should inform Congress of significant secret changes in U.S. foreign policy.

    (Full text of this Report)

    Clinton's Bosnia Policy and the Iranian Controversy

    A Look at Political, Military, and Strategic
    Developments and their Consequences
    May 2, 1996
    The Balkan Institute
    Volume 1.4

    Congress has escalated its investigations into the Clinton Administration's secret policy of approving Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia. On April 24, House Speaker Newt Gingrich announced the formation of a select House International Relations subcommittee to examine the policy implications of the President's decision to give tacit approval to the shipments. The select committee will include five Republicans and three Democrats and be chaired by Henry Hyde (R-IL). On May 1, the House allocated $955,000 to fund the committee's investigation.

    The investigations will focus on whether the policy was legal, whether the Administration undertook a covert arms operation, whether it deceived Congress, whether the policy adversely affected U.S. relations with its allies, and whether the policy allowed Iran to cultivate closer political relations with Bosnia and use the country as a base for intelligence or terrorist operations.

    While the Congressional moves are unlikely to reveal an illegal, covert operation, and while they are certainly not devoid of partisan political considerations, the Administration's conflicting secret and public policies, conflicting statements to the Congress, and refusals to cooperate during early Congressional inquiries into the issue reveal a series of contradictions and inconsistencies.

    (Full text)

    Iran/Bosnia Arms - Hearing
    House International Relations Committee
    (30 May 96)

    Iran/Bosnia Arms

    House International Relations Committee
    - 30 May 96 Hearing

    The United States role in Iranian arms transfers
    to Croatia and Bosnia Committee on Rules,

    ( H.Rpt.104-551, May 2, 1996)

    U.S. Actions regarding Iranian and other arms transfers
    to the Bosnian Army, 1994-1995

    Congress 1996 Intelligence Reports
    Special report of the
    Select Commitee on Intelligence

    United States Senate
    January 4, 1995 to October 3, 1996

    John Gannon CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
    Current and projected national security threats to the
    United States and its interests abroad

    Global Threats to the
    United States and its Interests Abroad

    General Patrick Hughes
    Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

    Defense Intelligence Agency
    Defense Intelligence Agency








    News and views


    CIA: Bosnia Handout
    House Debate and Vote on
    Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act

    Senate testimony by
    CIA director-designate Lake

    Yugoslavia / Chemical weapons

    Voice of America 3/27/97

    Weapons Transfers to Iran
    FCNL Letter to US Senate on Bosnia
    Bosnia: Costs Are Exceeding DOD's Estimate

    (Briefing Report, 07/25/96)

    Remarks with NATO Secretary General Solana
    Clinton Sets Course For NATO Enlargement

    October 25, 1996

    Arms Sales Monitor

    No. 33 February 1997

    War Powers Resolution:
    Presidential Compliance

    Proposed Recipients of Military Training

    ASM No. 34 (RY 1998)

    Remarks by Samuel R. Berger,
    Deputy Assistant to the President
    for National Security Affairs

    The Wilson Center - June 18, 1996

    Ukraine Special Weapons - Nuclear,
    Biological Chemical and Missile Proliferation News

    Reportage, Commentary on Grachev-Perry Discussions -
    Grachev Holds News Conference After Talks

    Arms Sales Monitor

    No. 34 May 1997

    95006: Multinational Peacekeeping Operations:
    Proposals to Enhance Congressional Oversight

    H. Rpt. 104-18 Part 1.
    The Committee on National Security,
    having favorably reviewed titles I, II, III,
    and V and section 401 of the bill (H.R. 7)

    to revitalize the national security of the United States,
    recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

    H. Rpt. 104-18 Part 2.
    The Committee on International Relations
    has reported favorably on titles I, III, V, VI
    and sections 401 and 402 of the bill (H.R. 7)

    CIA: DCI Speech 2/22/96
    Deputy Secretary Talbott speech on Russia
    Peace Operations: U.S. Costs
    in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia,


    (FAS Public Interest Report -- May/June 1993)

    1995-96 Missile Defense Monitor

    FAS Email Archives

    Contingency Operations:
    Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil

    CSCE-NATO Appendices
    Missile Defense Monitor

    FAS Email Archives

    Sen. Glenn on NPT
    Hearing on current and projected
    national security threats

    Statement by Acting Director of Central Intelligence
    George J. Tenet Before the Senate
    Select Committee on Intelligence

    Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States

    Chinese Company Diverted American Machine Equipment
    to Weapons Manufacturing Plant

    MSWG Military Spending

    FAS Email Archives

    91018: German-American Relations
    in the New Europe

    1996 Global Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview
    Defense Intelligence Agency
    Middle East nuclear proliferation,
    nuclear-weapon-free zone subject of First Commitee draft text

    [18 Nov 1996] GA/DIS/3075

    First part of 1997 Conference on Disarmament

    begins with no agreement yet on agenda
    and work programme - 22 January 1997
    - UN Press Release DCF/282

    Missile Defense Monitor

    FAS Email Archives

    FAS Public Interest Report

    May/June 1993

    6/3/96: North Atlantic Council Address
    Conference Report Appropriations
    for the Department of Defense

    for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997

    Worldwide Threat Assessment
    Brief to the Senate Select Committee

    Country Analyses
    Human rights and the process of NATO enlargement

    hearing, May 13, 1997

    1996 National Security Strategy
    Central and Eastern European security concerns -
    NATO enlargement

    Where We Came From and Where It Leaves Us

    Contingency Operations:
    Defense Cost and Funding Issues

    NATO: Anachronism or Answer -
    An Argument for Collective Defense

    Export Administration Regulation; Simplification
    of Export Administration Regulations;

    Final Rule Department of Commerce Bureau
    of Export Administration March 25, 1996

    NATO-L NATO Expansion

    FAS Email Archives

    Missile Defense Monitor

    FAS Email Archives

    Report of the Commission on Protecting
    and Reducing Government Secrecy

    -General Provisions
    Producer-Consumer Relations

    War in Croatia, Serbian aggression and Croatian casualtiesSpy Satelite Images of War in BosniaWar Crimes in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
    International Crime Tribunal - Den HaagIFORYU-Spiritsm & Reincarnation